What Does a Cheap Meal Cost Us? · Chapter Three
A Pretty Penny
What goes into American food is decided increasingly by the companies that sell it and reviewed by almost no one — and the industry that makes it is winning immunity from the people it harms.
A company that wants to put a new chemical in American food does not have to tell anyone. Under a rule finalized in 20161, a manufacturer can convene its own experts, declare an additive “generally recognized as safe,” and start selling — notifying the FDA is voluntary2. By one count, companies have quietly self-certified about a thousand substances the agency has never seen3. Of the roughly ten thousand additives in the food supply, the FDA has never reviewed the safety of an estimated three thousand4.
That is why the American pantry still holds chemicals its trading partners abandoned decades ago. Potassium bromate5, a possible carcinogen banned across the European Union and the United Kingdom in 1990, is still permitted in US flour. Brominated vegetable oil6, barred in Britain in 1970, was not revoked by the FDA until 2024. Titanium dioxide7, which the EU banned as a food additive in 2022 after its scientists could not rule out damage to DNA, remains legal in American candy.
The pace of correction is its own indictment. The FDA revoked Red Dye No. 3 in January 20258 — under a 1960 law barring cancer-causing colors — but gave companies until 20279 to comply. States moved faster: California banned four additives in 202310, and in 2025 West Virginia barred seven dyes from school meals11. The administration’s own “Make America Healthy Again” report, in May 202512, counted more than 2,500 additives in use and named several as concerns — then largely left the fixing to voluntary phase-outs and a proposed rule that, a year on, had still not taken effect.
The unexamined chemical is only half the story. The other half is what happens when a chemical does harm and the person harmed goes looking for someone to answer for it. That door is being closed.
On June 25, 2026, the Supreme Court ruled 7 to 2, in Monsanto v. Durnell, that federal pesticide law bars a person from suing a manufacturer for failing to warn13 about a danger the label left off — so long as the label matches what the Environmental Protection Agency approved. The case was brought by a man who blamed the weedkiller Roundup for his cancer. Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the majority that the claim was preempted; the dissent said the ruling left the plaintiff “without a remedy.”14
The Court finished what the states had started. North Dakota15, in April 2025, became the first to write into law that an EPA-approved pesticide label is a sufficient warning; Georgia16 followed weeks after a jury there ordered Bayer to pay $2.1 billion in a Roundup case. Similar bills moved through a dozen more statehouses17 in 2025 and 2026, and a version nearly rode the federal farm bill.
The campaign has an author. The bills are promoted by a group called the Modern Ag Alliance, founded by Bayer in 202418, that presents itself as a farmers’ coalition. Bayer spent heavily to pass them — more than $1.8 million in Tennessee in a single year19, hundreds of thousands more elsewhere — while working to cap a liability it had bought.
It bought that liability with Monsanto, and Roundup with it, for $63 billion in 201820, two years after the World Health Organization’s cancer agency called the weedkiller’s active ingredient “probably carcinogenic.” (The EPA disagrees; that split is the ground the whole fight is fought on.) By early 2026 the company faced some 65,000 pending lawsuits21 and had set aside around $16 billion22 against them.
In February 2026 Bayer proposed a $7.25 billion class settlement23 — payouts from a few thousand dollars to $165,000 — to close the book on future Roundup claims. Between the settlement, the state shields and the Supreme Court, the cost of the harm is being fixed at a number the company chooses, and the courthouse door is being shut behind it.
So the two halves meet. What goes into the food is decided, increasingly, by the people who sell it, and reviewed by almost no one. What comes out of it — the illness, the claim, the day in court — is being closed off by law. The chemical is unexamined going in and unanswerable coming out. The bill for that arrangement does not disappear. It moves — onto the people who eat, and get sick, and pay. Who pays, and who profits, is the last chapter.
SENTINEL